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LITIGATING FOR THE HOMELAND:
AN INDIAN TREATY FRAMEWORK TO
CLIMATE LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF

JULIANA

Evan Neustater*
Climate change is an increasingly pressing issue on the world stage. The federal
government, however, has largely declined to address any problems stemming from the effects
of climate change, and litigation attempting to force the federal government to take action, as
highlighted by Juliana v. United States, has largely failed. This Note presents the case for a
class of plaintiffs more likely to succeed than youth plaintiffs in Juliana—federally recognized
Indian tribes. Treaties between the United States and Indian nations are independent
substantive sources of law that create enforceable obligations on the federal government. The
United States maintains a trust relationship with federal Indian tribes, and that relationship
obliges a duty of protection upon the federal government. This Note argues that those
obligations may support climate change claims under the theory that the government, by failing
to address climate change, has failed its duty of protection under its treaties.

*
J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School 2021. I am especially grateful to Marielle
Coutrix, Jared Looper, and Caroline Leahy for their commentary and insightful critiques of this Note, and
to the entire MJEAL staff for their tireless efforts in editing and cite-checking. I am particularly indebted
to the Student Scholarship Workshop, specifically Professors Nina Mendelson, Rebecca Eisenberg, and
Emily Prifogle, as well as my fellow students in the class, for their consistent feedback and support in
writing and rewriting this Note. My hope is that this Note will bring attention to climate change, arguably
the existential threat of our time, and will inspire people from all walks of life to take action to combat
this pressing problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Scientists from around the world have declared that Earth “clearly and
unequivocally faces a climate emergency.”1 Studies have suggested that
anthropogenic climate change may lead to roughly 150 million people losing their
homes, strong hurricanes obliterating coastal communities, and wildfires sweeping
through large regions, and many other unthinkable tragedies.2
Despite the enormity of the emergency, the United States government has
declined to take any action on climate change. The government, particularly the
Trump Administration, has instead opted to ignore climate change and even deny
that it is a problem.3 Typically, the role of regulating climate change-inducing
greenhouse gases would fall to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”),
which possesses federal authority to regulate those gases under the Clean Air Act.4
As the democratic process has broken down and failed to address climate change,
some members of the public have taken to the courts in an attempt to spur federal
1.
Andrew Freedman, More than 11,000 scientists from around the world declare a ‘climate emergency,’
WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2019, 10:18 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2019/11/05/morethan-scientists-around-world-declare-climate-emergency/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1.
2.
See Denise Lu & Christopher Flavelle, Rising Seas Will Erase More Cities by 2050, New Research
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/29/climate/coastalcities-underwater.html?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1; see also The Effects of Climate Change, NASA,
https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/.
3.
For example, President Trump announced he would withdraw the United States from the
Paris Agreement, a major international climate change agreement. See Brady Daniels, Trump Makes it
Official: U.S. Will Withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2019, 7:17 PM)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/11/04/trump-makes-it-official-us-willwithdraw-paris-climate-accord/?wpisrc=nl_todayworld&wpmm=1 (The Paris agreement set a global goal
to limit the planet’s temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius total.).
4.

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, et seq.

Fall 2020

Litigating for the Homeland

305

action. In a particularly notable case, Juliana v. United States,5 a group of young
plaintiffs sued the federal government, alleging that the government was actively
violating their rights under both the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the public trust doctrine.6 Juliana is perhaps the most famous
example of plaintiffs using litigation to provoke a response to climate change. The
case drew national attention7 but was subsequently dismissed by the Ninth Circuit
on the grounds that the court lacked authority under the Constitution to prompt the
federal government to take action.8 The legislature, not the judiciary, the court
reasoned, is the proper forum in which to address climate change.9
Though Juliana may have been dismissed, climate litigation is far from over.
Where the Juliana plaintiffs failed, Indian tribes may be able to succeed.10 Substantial
precedent under Indian treaties and the Indian Trust Doctrine suggests that Indian
tribes can demand action from the federal government. When Indian tribes agreed
to the treaties that resulted in the creation of their reservations, they were negotiating
for a homeland. The federal government regularly promised to hold that homeland
in trust and ensure it had the qualities to make it a livable place to call home.11 As
climate change continues to affect the world around us, tribal land—and importantly,
water—will be affected. If the federal government unrelentingly ignores climate
change and discourages remediation efforts, it will diminish the livability of tribal
reservations in violation of its treaties with many tribes.
Precisely because they can compel government action through treaty
obligations, Indian tribes are best situated to be the leading plaintiffs in the next
stage of climate litigation. Even though tribal plaintiffs represent an untested
strategy, the potential social impact of such litigation should not be understated.
Climate lawsuits against the federal government brought by indigenous communities

5.
Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (D. Or. 2018), mandamus denied, 140 S. Ct. 16
(2019) [hereinafter Juliana II].
6.

Id.

7.
See, e.g., Steve Kroft, The Climate Change Lawsuit That Could Stop the U.S. Government from
Supporting Fossil Fuels, CBS NEWS (June 23, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/juliana-versus-unitedstates-the-climate-change-lawsuit-that-could-stop-the-u-s-government-from-supporting-fossil-fuels-60minutes/.
8.

Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2020) [hereinafter Juliana III].

9.
Id. at 1165 (“[T]he plaintiffs’ impressive case for redress must be presented to the political
branches of government.”).
10. Throughout this Note, I refer to Native American tribes as “Indian” tribes since that is the
term the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes employ. I do, however, recognize the historical inaccuracy
of the term and recognize that Indian tribes are not a homogenous group and have a remarkably diverse
range of cultures, languages, and ideologies.
11. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908) (stating that the purpose of an
Indian reservation is “to provide the Indians with a permanent home and abiding place”).
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would, at the very least, help bring attention to and advance the discussion around
climate policy.
This Note argues that federally recognized Indian tribes are
underappreciated environmental plaintiffs who are best situated to spur climate
action from the federal government due to the obligation the federal government
owes tribes under the duty of protection. Part I explores the Indian Trust Doctrine
as it relates to treaty rights to explain that the federal government has an obligation
to preserve the homelands Indian tribes duly bargained for. Part II surveys the
current scope of climate change litigation, using Juliana to demonstrate that current
litigation strategies are inadequate largely due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms.
Part III suggests that the government’s affirmative treaty obligations to Indian
Tribes present a better opportunity for climate change litigation, arguing that courts
should construe treaty rights broadly to encompass the duty to protect ecosystems
and environmental resources on tribal reservations. That treaty-based framework,
this Note contends, is a compelling legal strategy to move climate litigation forward.

I. TREATIES AND TRUST
A. Establishment of the Indian Trust Doctrine
Tribal sovereignty has existed since long before the founding of the United
States.12 Much of the Indian sovereignty jurisprudence was framed by Chief Justice
John Marshall in the early nineteenth century in a series of cases known as the
“Marshall Trilogy.” Marshall authored three opinions13 that have served as the
foundation of federal Indian law and policy throughout the history of the United
States and continue to be good law today. 14
The single most important case for the recognition of tribal sovereignty is
Johnson v. M’Intosh.15 In M’Intosh, Justice Marshall outlined what has come to be
known as the “doctrine of discovery,” which stated that conquering European nations
“had the sole right of acquiring soil from the natives.”16 While acknowledging that
the sovereign rights of Indians were still extant, Justice Marshall reasoned that “their
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished,
and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased,
was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title
12.

See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 3 (1831).

13. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
14.
(2006).

See Mathew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 627-28

15.

See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).

16.

Id. at 573.
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to those who made it.”17 Some of the European powers who “discovered” the tribes
recognized the tribes’ inherent sovereignty by negotiating treaties with them.18
Seven years after M’Intosh, Justice Marshall addressed whether Indian
tribes were “foreign States” under the Constitution.19 Justice Marshall reasoned that
tribes were neither “foreign states” nor among the “Several States” of the Union;
indeed, they were something different altogether: “domestic dependent nations.”20
As such, Indian tribes were sovereign, existing within the external boundaries of the
United States yet dependent upon the federal government. They could be
appropriately defined as “states,” however, since “[t]he numerous treaties made with
them by the United States recognize[d] them as a people capable of maintaining the
relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their political character for any
violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of
the United States by any individual of their community.”21 Stressing their
dependence on the United States for certain needs, Justice Marshall argued that the
tribes’ relation to the United States “resemble[d] that of a ward to his guardian.”22
This legal rationale is the framework upon which federal Indian law is still based.
Notably, these cases established the principles of the trust relationship between the
federal government and tribes.23
The Indian Trust Doctrine has been described by Professor Mary C. Wood
as “the purest moral foundation of the trust: the sacred promise, made to induce
massive land cessions, that the retained homelands would be protected to support
tribal lifeways and generations into the future.”24 In Seminole Nation v. United States,
the Supreme Court articulated the duties of the United States to “charge[] itself with
moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust … Its conduct, as disclosed
in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians,” the Court specified,
“should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.”25 The trust

17.

Id. at 574 (emphasis added).

18. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of ‘Domestic Dependent Nations’ in the TwentyFirst Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, UTAH L. REV. 443, 45758 (2005).
19.

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).

20.

Id. at 17.

21.

Id. at 16.

22.

Id. at 17.

23. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04(3) (Nell Jessup Newton
ed., 2012).
24. Mary C. Wood, Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and Resources Through Claims
of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355, 368 (2003).
25.

Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
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relationship’s most important and substantive effect arises from treaties made with
tribes under Article II of the Constitution.

B. Treaties and the Duty of Protection
When the original European conquerors and later American settlers made
treaties with Indian tribes to take their land, tribes were negotiating for a homeland.
In United States v. Winans, a staple of Indian treaty rights law, the Supreme Court
explained that Indian reservations were created, at least in part, to reserve the right
of Indians to hunt and fish.26 During negotiations for the Point–No–Point Treaty
with the S'Klallam, the Chimakum, and the Skokomish tribes in Washington in the
1850s, Governor Isaac Stevens told the tribes: “This paper [the treaty] is such as a
man would give to his children and I will tell you why. This paper gives you a home.
Does not a father give his children a home?”27 Employing the Indian Canon of
Construction compelling courts to construe Indian Treaties liberally in favor of the
tribes,28 the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Washington determined that the tribe
was indeed bargaining for a place to live—a home.29
Although the precise word “home” is not found in most treaties, it can be
found in case law. The Ninth Circuit has noted that the “specific purposes of an
Indian reservation, however, were often unarticulated. The general purpose, to
provide a home for the Indians, is a broad one and must be liberally construed.”30
This idea has deep, and enduring, roots. As early as 1908, the Supreme Court
observed that the true purpose of an Indian reservation is “to provide the Indians
with a permanent home and abiding place.”31
Indian reservations are those lands carved out specifically for tribes as their
homeland; they are places where they may retain their culture and resources.32 Indian
tribes and the United States bargained for concessions later memorialized in
26.

United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 378-89 (1905).

27. Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 667 n.11
(1979) (emphasis added).
28. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) (“The canon of construction applied over
a century and a half by this Court is that the wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with
the Indians is not to be construed to their prejudice.” (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
582 (1832)); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942) (“It is our responsibility to see that the
terms of the treaty are carried out, so far as possible . . . in a spirit which generously recognizes the full
obligation of this nation to protect the [Indian] interests . . . .”).
29. United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 851 (9th Cir. 2016), amended and superseded, 853
F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017).
30.

Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981).

31.

Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908).

32.

See Wood, supra note 24.
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treaties.33 These treaty negotiations often involved unequal bargaining power and
considerable language barriers, with the United States holding far more power than
the tribes.34 When tribes conceded or lost their lands, they received some
consideration in return: a promise to protect those lands.35 This treaty relationship
created the so-called “duty of protection” under the trust relationship.36 Felix Cohen,
the father of modern Federal Indian law, wrote: “[t]he promise of such protection
for lands retained by the Indian tribes was an important quid pro quo in the process
of treaty-making by which the United States acquired a vast public domain.”37 That
duty is an essential part of the Indian Trust Doctrine and critical to this Note’s
proposed litigation strategy. Treaty-based claims, bolstered by the Trust Doctrine,
would support tribal climate litigation.
The federal government recently reaffirmed its commitment to the duty of
protection. In the Indian Trust Asset Reform Act of 2016,38 Congress found that
“historic Federal-tribal relations and understandings have benefitted the people of
the United States as a whole for centuries and have established enduring and
enforceable Federal obligations to which the national honor has been committed.”39
Congress also acknowledged in the Indian Trust Asset Reform Act that “the United
States has undertaken a unique trust responsibility to protect and support Indian
tribes and Indians.”40 That Act further asserts that “the fiduciary responsibilities of
the United States to Indians also are founded in part on specific commitments made
through written treaties . . . which provided legal consideration for permanent,
ongoing performance of Federal trust duties…and have established enduring and
enforceable Federal obligations.”41

33.

See, e.g., Treaty with the Navajo Tribe of Indians, 15 Stat. 667 (1868).

34. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905) (justifying interpretation of treaty terms
in favor of Indian tribes based on unequal bargaining power).
35. See Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 662
(1979),modifiedsubnom, Washingtonv.UnitedStates,444U.S.816(1979) (“[T]he Indians relinquished
their interest in most of the Territory in exchange for monetary payments, certain relatively small parcels
of land reserved for their exclusive use, and other guarantees, including protection of their ‘right of taking
fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory.’”).
36. See Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1224-27 (1975) (arguing that courts improperly treat the trust duty as “a moral
obligation, without justiciable standards for its enforcement”).
37. Nathan R. Margold, Introduction to FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
vii, xii (1942).
38.

Pub. L. No. 114-178, 130 Stat. 432 (2016).

39.

25 U.S.C. § 5601(5) (emphasis added).

40.

§ 5601(3).

41.

§§ 5601(4)-(5).
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The Department of the Interior, the federal agency charged with the
responsibility of Indian affairs, since at least 1978 has maintained the official position
that the United States owes a fiduciary duty to Indian tribes “of care and loyalty, to
make trust property income productive, to enforce reasonable claims on behalf of
Indians, and to take affirmative action to preserve trust property.”42 Moreover, the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has acknowledged its trust responsibility
in official policy statements: the “EPA recognizes that a trust responsibility derives
from the historical relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes
. . . . In keeping with that trust responsibility, the Agency will endeavor to protect
the environmental interests of Indian Tribes when carrying out its responsibilities
that may affect the reservations.”43 The Act’s language and the official policy stances
of the federal agencies with direct responsibilities over tribal welfare reflect the
federal government’s understanding that its duty to tribes is a long-standing doctrine
with affirmative obligations.
The Supreme Court held in Washington v. Washington State that Indian
nations negotiated for the federal government to act in “good faith” to effectuate the
duty of protection.44 In dicta, the Court reasoned that “[i]t is perfectly clear, however,
that the Indians were vitally interested in protecting their [resources] . . . and that
they were invited by the white negotiators to rely and in fact did rely heavily on the
good faith of the United States to protect that right.”45 Treaties were the primary
mechanism by which tribes bargained for that duty of protection in exchange for
diminishing their lands for white settlement.
Unfortunately for Indian tribes, the duty of protection has, until recently,
been largely thrown by the wayside. Scholars have noted the duty has historically
been treated as “essentially just a mere platitude”46 with limited, if any, enforceable
legal power. The government’s ability to ignore its moral and legal obligations grew
as the Supreme Court regularly deferred to the discretion of the federal government
in deciding how to implement the duty of protection. In 1903, for instance, the Court
held in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock that the Court would stay out of Indian affairs,
reasoning (perhaps naïvely) that the United States would act in “good faith” to

42. Letter from Leo Krulitz, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to James W. Moorman, Asst.
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2 (Nov. 21, 1978).
43. William D. Ruckelshaus, EPA Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on
IndianReservations3(Nov.8,1984),https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-04/documents/in
dian-policy-84.pdf.
44.

Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n., 443 U.S. 658, 667 (1979).

45.

Id.

46 Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, “We Need Protection from Our Protectors”: The
Nature, Issues, and Future of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 6 MICH. J. ENV’T. & ADMIN. L. 397,
399 (2017).
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effectuate its duty of protection and trust vis-à-vis Indian tribes.47 Today, courts
remain hesitant to interfere with judgments of Congress which “can be tied rationally
to the fulfillment of the obligation toward the Indians.”48 This discarding of the duty
of protection has been disastrous for Indian tribes. Through most of the twentieth
century, the federal government often eliminated tribal lands without tribal consent
and eliminated other aspects of tribal sovereignty, 49 such as the right to remain
immune from public takings without just compensation.50
While the historical realities would seem to make any climate change claim
against the federal government fruitless, more recent trends should give tribes, and
those looking for opportunities for environmental litigation, a sense of hope.51
Though courts may still be reluctant to review government action, modern Supreme
Court jurisprudence has suggested that courts should more carefully scrutinize
legislative and federal administrative actions vis-à-vis tribes. For example, in United
States v. Sioux Nation, the Court rejected Lone Wolf’s unquestioned “presumption of
congressional good faith” and held that:
[I]n every case where a taking of treaty-protected property is
alleged,a reviewing court must recognize that tribal lands are
subject to Congress' power tocontrol and manage the tribe's
affairs. But the court must also be cognizant that “this power to
control and manage [is] not absolute. While extending to all
appropriate measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it [is]
subject to limitations inhering in . . . a guardianship and to
pertinent constitutional restrictions.52
In other words, a reviewing court will not simply defer to the judgment of Congress
in treaty disputes concerning property or diminishment of resources. A treaty-based
climate change claim would encounter a similar lack of Congressional deference, as
it would involve the diminishment of resources. Similarly, the Court today
acknowledges “the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the
47.

Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903).

48.

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).

49.

See Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 46, at 368-69.

50 . Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 284-85 (1955) (holding that a tribe was
not entitled to compensation for the taking by the federal government of tribal resources under the Fifth
Amendment because the tribe did not own those resources).
51. See, e.g., Indian Trust Asset Reform Act, 25 U.S.C. § 5601(3) (“Congress finds that . . . through
treaties, statutes, and historical relations with Indian tribes, the United States has undertaken a unique
trust responsibility to protect and support Indian tribes and Indians. . . .”).
52. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980) (quoting United States v.
Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1935)).
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United States and the Indian people.”53 A reviewing court should, in a treaty-rights
claim, scrutinize federal action (or lack thereof) affecting treaty rights. These treaty
rights directly give rise to the duty of protection under the Trust Doctrine.
The United States’ duty of protection towards Indian tribes is in fact
enforceable.54 The Eighth Circuit, for example, held that the Bureau of Indian Affairs
and Indian Health Service has a duty to clean up dumps on Indian land, which is
“buttressed by the existence of the general trust relationship between these agencies
and the Tribe.”55 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the federal government has
a fiduciary relationship in the management of tribal mineral resources by “taking into
account these specific, congressionally-imposed duties, and the long-standing,
general trust relationship between the government and the Indians.”56 And, in a
ruling with particularly important implications for treaty suits, the District Court for
the Western District of Washington held that the federal government’s “fiduciary
duty, rather than any express regulatory provision . . . mandates that the [Army
Corps of Engineers] take treaty rights into consideration.”57
Similarly, federal courts have relied on statutory and general trust duties
(largely arising from treaties) to order the federal government to affirmatively act to
fulfil its duty of protection to the land, resources, and water of Indian tribes. This is
particularly important if tribes go to court to enforce duties to protect against climate
change, as climate change will most obviously affect land, resources, and water. In
1973, for instance, the District Court for the District of Columbia heard a challenge
from the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians against a regulation promulgated by
the Secretary of the Interior.58 The Tribe argued the regulation would negatively
impact their water supply and therefore violate the duty of protection stemming from
53. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) [hereinafter Mitchell II]; see also United
States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 176 (2011) (“We do not question ‘the undisputed existence
of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people.’”) (quoting Mitchell II,
463 U.S. at 225); United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474 n.3 (2003) (“We
have recognized a general trust relationship since 1831.”).
54. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Nation v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 726, 738 (2011) (“[The United
States] would have this court blithely accept what so many courts have rejected—that for the breach of a
fiduciary duty to be actionable in this court, that duty must be spelled out, in no uncertain terms, in a
statute or regulation.”); White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 475-76 (affirming implied trust duty);
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Trump, 428 F. Supp. 3d 282, 294 (D. Montana 2019) (“The trust relationship
between the United States and the Indian people imposes a fiduciary duty on the government when it
conducts ‘any Federal government action which relates to Indian Tribes.’”) (quoting Nw. Sea Farms, Inc.
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515, 1519-20 (W.D. Wash. 1996)).
55.

Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989).

56. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation v. Bd. of Oil and Gas
Conservation of Montana, 792 F.2d 782, 794 (9th Cir. 1986).
57.

Nw. Sea Farms, Inc., 931 F. Supp. at 1520.

58.

Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
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its treaty with the United States.59 In ruling for the Tribe, the court held that the
federal government, through the Secretary of the Interior, was “obliged to formulate
a closely tailored regulation that would preserve water for the Tribe.”60 The court
also found “the Secretary's action . . . defective and irrational because it fails to
demonstrate an adequate recognition of his fiduciary duty to the Tribe.”61 A tribe
suing for a failure to protect against an effect of climate change, then, could feasibly
model their case after Pyramid Lake and produce evidence that some regulation (or
lack thereof) contributed to water degradation from climate change.
The Ninth Circuit further noted in 2005 that it reads the trust obligation
“to extend to any federal government action,” and that the United States must “honor
its trust obligation to Indians.”62 While not specifically environmental in nature,
these cases demonstrate that federal courts are willing to compel the federal
government to enforce affirmative obligations vis-à-vis tribes on the basis of treaty
rights.

C. Water, Winters, Winans, and Washington
Perhaps the most pertinent trust obligation the United States has with
Indian tribes concerns water rights. For its part, the federal government
acknowledges it holds water rights in trust for tribes.63 And since the early 1900s, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged and defended tribal rights to water based on
express and implied treaty rights.64
The seminal case addressing Indian water rights, United States v. Winans,65
establishes the framework for an environmental suit arising under a treaty. In the
early 1900s, the Winans brothers operated state-licensed fish wheels, designed to
scoop as many fish as possible, on the Columbia River in Washington.66 The wheel
disturbed the Yakima Tribe’s ancestral fishing territory by systematically capturing

59.

Id.

60.

Id. at 256.

61.

Id. at 256-57.

62. Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan, 415 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
63. See, e.g., Federal Criteria and Procedures for Indian Water Rights Settlements, 55 Fed. Reg.
9,223 (Mar. 12, 1990).
64. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Winans v. United States, 198 U.S.
371 (1905).
65.

198 U.S. 371 (1905).

66.

United States v. Winans, 73 F. 72 (D. Wash. 1896).
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huge quantities of fish and occupying significant land.67 Further, the Winans
brothers prohibited the Yakima tribe from crossing their land, thus preventing the
tribe from accessing traditional fishing places68 in violation of tribal treaty
guarantees to “the exclusive right of taking fish . . . at all usual and accustomed
places.”69
The United States government brought suit on behalf of the tribe. On
appeal, the Supreme Court issued a statement now central to federal Indian law: “the
treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them—a
reservation of those [rights] not granted.”70 This established the “reserved rights
doctrine,” under which tribes retain their original sovereign title until tribes
affirmatively surrender them. As stipulated by their treaty, “the Indians were given
a right in the land” and could use their traditional fishing spots since the land was
granted to them.71 Importantly, the Court held that those rights date from “time
immemorial.”72
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Winters v. United States.73
Leading up to Winters, the Fort Belknap reservation in Montana’s territory had been
gradually diminished by successive treaties throughout the late 1800s, until
ultimately the 1888 Desert Land Act confined the reservation to just 1400 square
miles.74 After Montana achieved statehood, the white defendants built dams on the
channel and diverted water resources from the reservation.75 In response, the federal
government then filed suit on behalf of the tribe.76 The Supreme Court decided that
even though the Desert Land Act did not lay it out in explicit terms, the statute
implicitly protected water in the Milk River for the tribe.77 Using similar reasoning as
it did in developing the Winans Reserved Rights doctrine, the Court explained that
67.

Winans, 198 U.S. at 380.

68.

Id.

69.

Id. at 378.

70.

Id. at 381.

71.

Id.

72.

Id. at 374.

73.

207 U.S. 564 (1908).

74.

Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1906).

75. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. at 564, 567 (1908) (“It is alleged that . . . the defendants, in
the year 1900, wrongfully entered upon the river and its tributaries above the points of the diversion of
the waters of the river by the United States and the Indians, built large and substantial dams and reservoirs,
and, by means of canals and ditches and waterways, have diverted the waters of the river from its channel,
and have deprived the United States and the Indians of the use thereof.”).
76.

Id. at 565.

77.

See id.
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“the power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from
appropriation under state laws is not denied, and could not be . . . . That the
Government did reserve them we have decided, and for a use that would necessarily
continue through the years.”78
The Winters decision recognized implied water rights, based on the idea that
treaties implicitly contain the right to enough water to satisfy the purpose of the
reservation. Winters rights apply federally and preempt state law. Winters rights are
critically important to tribes, particularly in the West, where prior appropriation
doctrine applies.79 In the West, the allocation of water rights largely depend on the
priority date a given entity has. When determining priority, Winters rights derive
from the date on which the reservation was created.80 Most importantly, this implied
right to water could play a key role in climate change litigation as the changing
climate affects the availability of water enough to affect the “purposes of the
reservation,” including having a stable enough ecosystem to sustain fishing and
hunting. This will be further analyzed in Part III.
Courts have broadly construed their powers to enact remedies stemming
from these implied water rights, including recently in United States v. Washington
(“The Culvert Case”).81 Lower courts had found that numerous road culverts, small
tunnels underneath roadways that divert water through the road’s foundation, had
blocked salmon access to their habitat in violation of Indian treaties. In 2017, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court injunction requiring Washington to repair and
replace culverts restricting the passage of fish.82 The court interpreted the plaintiff
tribes’ treaty right to “take fish” to include protection of fishery habitat from manmade alterations.83 In construing the treaty in favor of the Indian tribes, the Ninth
Circuit held that the tribes’ primary purpose for entering the treaties “was to secure
a means of supporting themselves once the Treaties took effect.”84 Finding that the
culverts disrupted the tribes’ ability to support themselves through fishing, the court
held that the state “has violated, and is continuing to violate, its obligation to the
78.

Id. at 577.

79. See, e.g., Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights and the Federal Trust Responsibility, 46 NAT.
RES. J. 399, 409-10 (2006). In the West, rights to water largely depend on the priority date a given entity
has. For tribes, the priority date depends on whether the tribe was using the water before the reservation
was created or was contemplated by the creation of the reservation. For Winters rights the priority date is
the date on which the reservation was created. Winans rights date from “time immemorial,” giving that
reservation first priority. Id. at 412-13.
80.

See id. at 412-14.

81.

Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018).

82. United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 980 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 735
(2018), aff'd by an equally divided court, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018).
83.

Washington, 853 F.3d at 954.

84.

Id. at 963-64.
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Tribes under the Treaties.”85 Though the state was not a party to the original treaty,
the court still found it had violated tribal rights.
The Supreme Court affirmed without an opinion, leaving in place the order
directing the State of Washington to replace state-owned culverts.86 The Ninth
Circuit compelled the state to take costly action to remedy an environmental-based
harm, something the same circuit court refused to do in Juliana.87 Ultimately, the
tribes’ Article II treaties created an unalienable right to sufficient water, enforceable
by a cause of action against the state government. Washington reaffirmed a Supreme
Court holding nearly 40 years earlier that water rights are “implicitly secured to the
Indians by treaties reserving land” and that these implicit rights could require “an
apportionment to the Indians of enough water to meet their subsistence and
cultivation needs.88 In line with Washington, the EPA updated its Human Health
Water Quality Standards in 2016 to support “the interpretation of tribal fishing
rights to include the right to sufficient water quality to effectuate the fishing right.”89
These decisions confirm that treaty rights are an independent source of law
that create environmental rights for Indian tribes and impose enforceable obligations
on state and federal actors to protect those rights. Government agents negotiated
Article II treaties with Indian tribes to cede land to the United States while also
carving out a livable homeland for tribes. That right to a homeland is an independent
substantive source of law, enforceable against the government under the Trust
Doctrine. As Part III will explore, these rights suggest that Indian tribes may be the
ideal candidates to advance climate litigation and demand accountability from the
federal government, even where other plaintiffs have failed.

II. THE PROBLEM WITH CURRENT CLIMATE LITIGATION
Plaintiffs seeking to hold the federal government accountable have
unsuccessfully tried multiple approaches. This section summarizes the various
attempts, discusses why they failed, and demonstrates why Indian tribes do not face
the same roadblocks.

A. The Death of Atmospheric Trust Litigation
Current climate change litigation is inadequate to meet the urgency of the
problem. The most high-profile case concerning climate litigation, Juliana v. United
85.

Id. at 966.

86.

Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018).

87.

See infra Part II.

88.

Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).

89. Revision of Certain Federal Water Quality Criteria Applicable to Washington, 81 Fed. Reg.
85,417, 85,423 n.39 (Nov. 28, 2016).
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States, was dismissed by the Ninth Circuit in 2020.90 Utilizing “atmospheric trust
litigation,” a group of young plaintiffs aged eight to nineteen alleged that the federal
government was violating their Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights. 91
The plaintiffs asserted that the federal government, “[b]y their exercise of sovereign
authority over our country'satmosphereand fossil fuel resources, permitted,
encouraged, and otherwise enabled continued exploitation, production, and
combustion of fossil fuels, . . . deliberately allow[ing]atmospheric[carbon
dioxide]concentrations to escalate to levels unprecedented in human history[.]”92
The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief ordering the federal government to
cease permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing fossil fuels and instead move swiftly
to phase outcarbon dioxide emissions.93 They also asked the court to order the
government to take such action as necessary to ensure thatatmosphericCO2is no
more concentrated than 350 ppm by 2100, “including to develop a national plan to
restore Earth's energy balance, and implement that national plan so as to stabilize the
climate system.”94 These bold requests reflect the urgency the litigants felt was
needed to address climate change since government gridlock impeded the action
necessary to protect their rights.95
While District Judge Aiken initially refused to dismiss the suit in an
apparent win for the “atmospheric trust” litigants, the Ninth Circuit overturned her
ruling.96 The Ninth Circuit “reluctantly” concluded that the relief plaintiffs sought
was “beyond [their] constitutional power.”97 Although the majority agreed that “[t]he
record left little basis for denying that climate change is occurring at an increasingly
rapid pace,”98 the court ultimately determined that the case was not justiciable.99
Central to their determination was that Article III courts are not the proper place to

90.

Juliana III, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).

91.

Id. at 1164.

92.

Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016) [hereinafter Juliana I].

93. Id. at 1247-48. Carbon dioxide is widely considered to be one of the chief greenhouse gases
responsible for climate change.
94.

Id. at 1248.

95.

Juliana III, 947 F.3d at 1175 (Staton, J., dissenting).

96.

Id.

97.

Id. at 1165.

98.

Id. at 1166.

99. Id. at 1175 (“We reluctantly conclude, however, that the plaintiffs’ case must be made to the
political branches or to the electorate at large, the latter of which can change the composition of the
political branches through the ballot box. That the other branches may have abdicated their responsibility
to remediate the problem does not confer on Article III courts, no matter how well-intentioned, the ability
to step into their shoes.”).
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adjudicate climate change.100 Because the court determined that neither the
Constitution nor the Administrative Procedure Act provided grounds for redress, it
held that there was no source of law to support the plaintiffs’ claim.101
Atmospheric trust suits like Juliana have so far failed.102 Even Juliana, the
most well-known of these suits, only achieved short-lived success.103 Federal courts
have, on the whole, been unwilling to take sweeping steps to create new substantive
rights to a healthy environment under the Constitution. The Third Circuit has held
that “there is no constitutional right to a pollution-free environment.”104 The Fourth
Circuit, similarly, has held that there is no constitutional right to a healthy
environment,105 and the District Court for the Northern District of California ruled
that there is no fundamental right to be free from climate change pollution.106

B. Current Inadequacies Under the Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act107 establishes a framework of cooperative federalism to
regulate air quality. The Act grants states primary responsibility to ensure that they
meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”).108 In the traditional
cooperative federalism model, states must submit state implementation plans
(“SIPs”) that outline how they plan to implement, maintain, and enforce the
NAAQS.109 While this grants states a fair bit of power in environmental regulation,
the SIPs must be approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) before
they may be federally enforced.110 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act extended
to Indian tribes for the first time the authority previously granted only to states.111

100. Id.
101. Id. at 1167, 1175.
102. See, e.g., Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981);
Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
103. See Juliana III, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
104. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 616 F.2d at 1238.
105. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971).
106. S.F. Chapter of A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. EPA, No. C-07-4936-CRB, 2008 WL 859985, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008).
107. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.
108. See § 7407(a).
109. See § 7410(a)(1).
110. § 7410(k).
111. § 7410(o).
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Those amendments specified that Indian nations may submit tribal implementation
plans (“TIPs”) “applicable to all areas . . . located within the exterior boundaries of
the reservation.”112 The Act granted EPA the authority to “treat Indian tribes as
States” if they meet certain enumerated criteria.113 The Clean Air Act continues to
be the only federal statute courts recognize as addressing air pollution.114
Like states, tribes have been divested of significant authority under the
EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, largely sacrificing that power to the
federal government.115 The Clean Air Act, however, grants tribes and states certain
avenues to opt to regulate their air more stringently than the statute requires. For
example, EPA regulations allow both tribes and states to re-designate their territory
into a more protective category under the Act to improve air quality.116 The EPA
maintains a trust responsibility to “ensure the protection of air quality throughout
the nation, including throughoutIndiancountry.”117 Tribes are still heavily reliant on
federal regulation for their welfare, though. The TIPs, while created by the tribes
themselves, are still subject to EPA approval.118
The Clean Air Act’s overall failure to address climate change is the primary
driver of most climate litigation; interestingly, the Clean Air Act itself has been the
death blow to those suits. An example of this tension is the 2011 Supreme Court
decision American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut (“AEP”). In that case the
plaintiffs argued that AEP contributed to global warming by emitting CO2 and
therefore substantially and unreasonably interfered with public rights in violation of
the federal common law of interstate nuisance.119 The Court ruled for the defendants,
holding that the Clean Air Act displaced any federal common law claims seeking

112. Id.
113. §§ 7601(d)(1), (d)(2)(A)-(C) (“(A) [T]he Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out
substantial governmental duties and powers; (B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain
to the management and protection of air resources within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or
other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction; and (C) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in
the judgment of the Administrator, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent
with the terms and purposes of this chapter and all applicable regulations.”).
114. See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
115. See Nicholas A. Fromherz & Joseph W. Mead, Equal Standing with States: Tribal Sovereignty
and Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 29 STAN. ENV’T. L. J. 130, 145 (2010).
116. 42 U.S.C. §7474. As of 2006, tribes had exercised this right on at least six occasions. See Sarah
B. Van de Wetering & Matthew McKinney, The Role of Mandatory Dispute Resolution in Federal
Environmental Law: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 21 J. ENV’T. L. & LITIG. 1, 3-4 (2006).
117. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254, 7265 (Feb. 12,
1998).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o).
119. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 418 (2011).
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injunctions against emissions of carbon dioxide since the Act was the exclusive federal
law governing air pollution.120
The Ninth Circuit extended AEP’s reasoning to damages claims in 2012,
holding that a small Alaskan tribe could not sue ExxonMobil, a fossil fuel producer,
for monetary damages under a federal common law public nuisance claim stemming
from the effects of climate change.121 The plaintiff in that case, the Native Village of
Kivalina, sought monetary damages rather than injunctive relief against private
defendants.122 Kivalina is located on the tip of a barrier reef on the northwest coast
of Alaska.123 The city has long been home to members of the Village of Kivalina, a
self-governing, federally recognized tribe of Inupiat Native Alaskans.124 Storms,
rising sea levels and the deterioration of ice walls resulting from climate change have
threatened the very existence of the city, and the tribe is seeking to relocate its village
as a result.125 The tribe attempted to sue under a federal public nuisance theory, only
to have that theory be displaced by the Clean Air Act.126 While some authority
suggests that plaintiffs may have cognizable air pollution claims under state law,127
tribes are more limited to federal remedies since state law typically has no force in
Indian country, barring an express Congressional exception.128
Climate litigation has, on the whole, been unsuccessful for plaintiffs seeking
redress against the federal government or greenhouse gas producers for the effects of
climate change.129
Indian tribes do not face these same problems. Treaties arise under Article
II of the Constitution and, bolstered by the Supremacy Clause, are the “supreme Law

120. Id.
121. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 853.
124. Id.
125. Kivalina, NORTHWEST ARCTIC BOROUGH, https://www.nwabor.org/village/kivalina/ (last
visited Nov. 4, 2020).
126. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858.
127. See, e.g., Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Freeman
v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 74 (Iowa 2014).
128. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557, 559 (1832); see also McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 177 (1973) (noting that Public Law 83-280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, establishes
“a method whereby States may assume jurisdiction over reservation Indians”).
129. But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (holding that if the EPA wishes to
continue its inaction on carbon regulation, it is required by the Act to base the decision on a consideration
of “whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change”).
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of the Land.”130 Treaties are independent sources of law and contain explicit and
implied rights to protect the bargained-for homeland.131 Tribes suing under treaty
rights would not have to identify an independent Constitutional or APA claim
against the government, as the Juliana plaintiffs tried and failed to do.132 Tribes
would not need to go to court and request the creation of an additional constitutional
right or proceed under a unique public trust theory. Article III courts have
determined treaty rights concerning environmental rights to be justiciable in the
past.133 Thus, tribes are uniquely situated to engage in impact climate litigation.

III.A TREATY-BASED REFORM
Winters and Winans establish a tribal right to a homeland. These homelands,
however, are becoming less livable because of climate change: tributaries in the West
are drying up and wild fires are spreading.134 The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change found that American Indian Tribes are disproportionately
vulnerable to climate change.135 That report concluded that “[i]ndigenous peoples are
among the first to face the direct consequences of climate change, owing to their
dependence upon, and close relationship with the environment and its resources.”136
Indeed, tribes have already felt the effects of climate change and may be inclined to
pursue a climate litigation strategy. Take the Native Village of Kivalina, for instance.
Their home is directly under threat from climate change.137 As the United Nations
reports suggest, there will likely be other tribes faced with similar challenges, making
litigation a near necessity for many tribes living under a dismissive federal regime.
Although tribes may be reluctant to go to court and risk setting bad precedent, the
urgency of the issue for tribes and the global population at large coupled with the
existence of favorable precedent and the potential for social impact may offset such
concerns.
130. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2017), aff'd, 138 S. Ct. 1832
(2018).
132. Id. (tribes can sue under a treaty obligation).
133. Id. at 959.
134. Kevin Taylor, Drought hits harder in already parched Indian Country, ALJAZEERA AM. (Mar. 19,
2014 5:00AM),http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/19/drought-is-nothingnewinindiancountry.
html.
135. Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples, UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT FORUM ON
INDIGENOUSISSUES,https://www.un.org/en/events/indigenousday/pdf/Backgrounder_ClimateChange
_FINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
136. Id.
137. See Kivalina, NORTHWEST ARCTIC BOROUGH, https://www.nwabor.org/village/kivalina/
(last visited Nov. 4, 2020).
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Treaty cases are best read to suggest that treaties include an implied right
to preserved aquatic ecosystems (at least enough to maintain the purposes of the
reservation) and to compel government action to protect them, as well as act on the
effects of climate change.138
Treaty rights expressly and impliedly include rights to a home and
resources. These treaties have compelled government action before and should do so
again in the climate change context. In United States v. Adair, the Ninth Circuit found
two primary purposes for establishing the reservation: the promise of a homeland to
maintain an agrarian society and the preservation of the tribe’s access to fishing
grounds.139 The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the purpose of the Wind River
Reservation in its state was to create a permanent homeland for the Indian nation,
which included an intent to reserve water.140 In the Culvert Case, the Ninth Circuit—
affirmed by the Supreme Court—ordered a government actor to spend billions of
dollars to preserve a tribe’s rights to fish, which included a right to enough
unobstructed water to maintain a salmon habitat.141
Winters and subsequent cases have held that reservations for Indian tribes
reserved rights to enough water to make those lands productive. As climate change
continues to dry up rivers and affect water levels, Indian tribes may have claims
against the federal government for failing to meet its treaty obligations. The treaties
create a duty of protection, and tribes may argue the government has failed to uphold
that duty in declining to act and instead willfully ignoring the effects of climate
change. If a court could order an injunction against the state of Washington for
interfering with a tribe’s access to its treaty-guaranteed water right, why could a court
not order the federal (or state) government to take action against proven effects of
climate change that interfere with a tribe’s right to water? It is not difficult to imagine
that a tribe might show that climate change has, for example, dried up a river affecting
salmon migration. Indeed, studies have already suggested that climate change is
138. See e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 69396 (1979) (holding that the Washington State Department of Fisheries and Fisheries Department could
be compelled to act in accordance with the court's interpretation of Indian fishing rights under treaties,
and that federal courts have power to displace local enforcement efforts if necessary to remedy violations
of Indian treaty rights); United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 965-66, 975 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding
that, although Washington state made no explicit promise, the court would infer a promise under the
tribes' treaties that fish stock would always be sufficient to provide a “moderate living” to the tribes and
holding that the breadth of an injunction requiring the state to act in accordance with the implied promise
was appropriate); United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 257-58 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (holding that
the Ottawa and Chippewa tribes retained an implied right to fish, although not explicitly conveyed in
their 1836 treaty with the United States government).
139. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983).
140. In re Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River, 753 P.2d 76, 85 (Wyo. 1988), aff’d by an equally
divided court sub nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
141. United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946, 963-64, 967, 979 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d,
Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018).
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negatively impacting salmon habitats.142 In Juliana the Ninth Circuit accepted that
climate change was a real phenomenon, stating “[t]he record leaves little basis for
denying that climate change is occurring at an increasingly rapid pace . . . The record
also conclusively establishes that the federal government has long understood the
risks of fossil fuel use and increasing carbon dioxide emissions.”143 With that factual
background accepted by the court, Juliana may have paved the way for Indian tribes,
particularly those located in the Ninth Circuit’s geographic region, to bring climate
claims under treaty rights.
At least one federal court has stated that “[t]he trust relationship between
the United States and the Indian people imposes a fiduciary duty on the government
when it conducts ‘any Federal government action which relates to
IndianTribes.’”144It is important to note, however, that the trust obligation by itself
is not universally viewed as possessing such great power. Treaties, on the other hand,
should impose affirmative obligations on federal agencies when treaty rights are
implicated. If the federal government interferes with a tribe’s treaty rights and fails
in its attendant duty of protection, the tribe may have a cognizable claim to force the
federal government to take action to mitigate its treaty violation.
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority in the recent case of McGirt v.
Oklahoma, recognized the importance of treaties for providing “a permanent home”
to the Creek Nation and “hold[ing] the government to its word.”145 In that case, the
Court suggested that governments may not simply cite that “the price is too great”
for courts to enforce treaty obligations.146 In declaring that most of Eastern
Oklahoma is in fact an Indian Reservation, the Court importantly demonstrated its
willingness to make consequential decisions in Indian law that could force massive
systemic changes.147 This may indicate that the modern Supreme Court has at least

142. LISA CROZIER, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., IMPACTS OF CLIMATE
CHANGEONCOLUMBIARIVERSALMON12-29(2015),https://www.webapps.nwfsc.noaa.gov/assets/11/
8473_07312017_171438_Crozier.2015-BiOp-Lit-Rev-Salmon-Climate-2014.pdf.
143. Juliana III, 947 F.3d at 1166.
144. Nw. Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515, 1519-20 (W.D. Wash.
1996).
145. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (2020).
146. Id. at 2482 (“Many of the arguments before us today follow a sadly familiar pattern. Yes,
promises were made, but the price of keeping them has become too great, so now we should just cast a
blind eye. We reject that thinking.”).
147. See id. at 2479 (“Oklahoma replies that its situation is different because the affected population
here is large and many of its residents will be surprised to find out they have been living in Indian country
this whole time. But we imagine some members of the 1832 Creek Tribe would be just as surprised to find
them there.”).
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one justice—a notably conservative one at that—willing to interpret treaties liberally
in climate change litigation.148
Litigants should argue that the duty of protection arising from treaty rights
encompasses the duty to protect ecosystems and environmental resources. Indian
reservations are those lands carved out specifically for tribes as their homeland. They
are places where they may retain their culture and resources—including water, air,
and land. Tribal members often express a particular affinity for environmental
stewardship representing their culturally-embedded relationship with the land.149
Many tribes believe they were spiritually appointed as stewards of the world.150
Tribes have fought for the right to protect their homelands, however small a piece
they could wrangle from the federal government’s grasp. Those homelands are often
held by the government in trust, with a fiduciary duty to protect and maintain them
for the benefit of the tribe. As Winters, Winans, Washington and other cases suggest,
treaties impose a general duty of protection on the United States to preserve the
reservation ecosystem bargained for by tribes. Climate change is profoundly
compromising that ecosystem. Litigants should argue that courts must construe
Indian treaties liberally (as the Indian Canons of Construction already require) to
include an implied right to a stable ecosystem beyond the previously recognized right
to appropriate water resources. 151 Indeed, the Indian Canons of Construction compel
courts to read treaties to “see that the terms of the treaty are carried out, so far as
possible . . . in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation
to protect the [Indian] interests.”152 Treaties already protect water on reservations,
and as that water becomes affected by climate change, resulting in excess flooding
and droughts, courts should use Indian treaties as substantive sources of law to hold
the United States accountable for its end of those agreements.
Take the Stevens treaty at issue in United States v. Washington. That treaty
protects the right to enough water to preserve the purposes of the reservation. If
rivers and tributaries were to dry up as a result of climate change (and the tribe could
prove it), they could arguably sue the federal government. The tribe would argue
148. See Washington State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016-21 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
149. While this is a broad generalization, many commentators have noted this affinity. See, e.g.,
Fromherz & Mead, supra note 115, at 173-74; see Mary Christine Wood & Zachary Welker, Tribes as
Trustees Again (Part I): The Emerging Tribal Role in the Conservation Trust Movement, 33 HARV. ENV’T. L.
REV. 373, 385 (2008).
150. See Wood & Welker, supra note 149, at 385.
151. See Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 684
(1979).
152. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); see also Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S.
194, 199 (1975) (“The canon of construction applied over a century and a half by this Court is that the
wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with the Indians is not to be construed to their
prejudice.”).
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that they signed a treaty with the intent to preserve enough water to sustain their
homeland, and the federal government, by failing to take action to address climate
change, violated that treaty. The claim would give rise to potential injunctions, like
in Washington, that could require the government to implement environmental
impact reviews or divert more water to tribal land. While a claim could not
realistically force the government to establish a nationwide climate change response
plan, it could require the government to take particular, discrete actions to assess
climate impact on the plaintiff tribes’ reservation and, at the very least, provide the
tribe with more resources to mitigate the impact.
While it may seem a stretch to go from fishing rights in a treaty to forcing
the federal government to take action to address a global problem, a suit of this nature
could have a profound social impact. Litigation designed to advance social
awareness—impact litigation—has benefits even if the merits of the lawsuit are
uncertain. Just like Juliana enhanced social awareness of climate change,153 a treatybased claim from an Indian tribe would similarly build momentum for change in the
courts and in federal policy circles more generally. Whether or not they ultimately
succeed on the merits, such lawsuits are at the very least tools of impact litigation
that could help mobilize social consciousness surrounding climate change.

A. Counterarguments
The primary obstacle in trust claims stemming from treaties is likely the
lack of express statutory obligations imposed on the federal government. The
holdings in two Supreme Court cases, United States v. Mitchell (“Mitchell I”)154 and its
successor, United States v. Mitchell (“Mitchell II”),155 present obstacles to tribes seeking
to sue under common law claims arising from treaty obligations. Nonetheless, these
cases are not dispositive. The two Mitchell cases have been described by the Supreme
Court as “pathmarking precedents on the question whether a statute or regulation
(or combination thereof) can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
Federal Government.”156 The cases concern the Indian Tucker Act, a jurisdictional
statute dictating how Indian tribes may sue the federal government for money
damages.157 The Mitchell cases hold that, to receive such compensation, a tribe must
153. See, e.g., Steve Kroft, The climate change lawsuit that could stop the U.S. government from supporting
fossil fuels, CBS NEWS (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/juliana-versus-united-states-theclimate-change-lawsuit-that-could-stop-the-u-s-government-from-supporting-fossil-fuels-60-minutes/.
154. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) [hereinafter Mitchell I].
155. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
156. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 489 (2002) [hereinafter Navajo I] (quoting
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 218).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (addressing monetary compensation damages, but not other remedies such
as declaratory or injunctive relief).
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identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific duties, and allege that
the federal government has failed to faithfully perform those duties.158 Typically, that
would include locating a specific statutory provision that the government is alleged
to have violated.159
However, Mitchell and its progeny do not address whether an Indian tribe
can state a claim for breach of trust related to treaty obligations. Substantive rights
can be “found in some other source of law, such as the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department.”160 Treaties, as “acts of
Congress,” fit into that description. Under the Constitution’s Article II Treaty
Clause161 and the Supremacy Clause,162 treaties are particularly powerful sources of
law—indeed, the “supreme law of the land.”163 As Justice Sotomayor has noted, the
Supreme Court “[has] never held that all of the Government’s trust responsibilities
to Indians must be set forth expressly in a specific statute or regulation.”164 Instead,
the Court has “settled precedent that looks to common-law trust principles to define
the scope of the Government’s fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes.”165
Moreover, the Mitchell line of cases has even less relevance to treaty claims
that are not seeking money damages but instead just declaratory and injunctive relief.
TheIndianTuckerActis merely a jurisdictional provision that operates to waive
sovereign immunity for claims premised upon other sources of law.166 It does not
govern suits alleging treaty violations. Treaties are independent and enforceable
sources of law that reserve rights, even when they are implied,167 and demand the
duty of protection. That there is no specific statutory mandate obligating the federal
government to maintain an Indian tribe’s ecosystem should not bar litigation by
Indian tribes. Tribal treaties carry their own force of law and can obligate the federal
government to act under the duty of protection.

158. Navajo I, 537 U.S. at 490.
159. Id.
160. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 216.
161. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
162. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
163. Id. (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme law of the land.”).
164. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 202 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 188.
166. United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 (2009).
167. See supra Part I.C.
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CONCLUSION
Climate litigation on the whole has been unsatisfactory for environmental
plaintiffs. Courts have been reluctant to order the federal government to take action.
Indian tribes often have Article II treaties, cognizable under the Constitution, as
independent sources of law compelling a duty of protection upon the federal
government. Federal Indian law already establishes that treaties create implied rights
to water and fishing spots on reservations, and federal courts have used those rights
to enforce affirmative obligations on government actors. As climate change litigation
presses forward, Indian tribes are ideal plaintiffs to sue under a treaty-based
framework to demand accountability from the federal government. In turn, courts
should liberally construe treaties to include a duty of protection from the government
obliging it to preserve a reservation’s water and ecosystem—including ameliorating
deterioration from climate change.

